Austin Mitchell
was a backbench
Labour MP for 40
years before
stepping down in
2015.
A
self-confessed
maverick who
refused to toe
the party line,
he has always
been fiercely
opposed to
Britain
remaining in the
EU.
Here, on the
second
anniversary of
the
EU referendum,
he delivers a
powerful and
timely reminder
of why
Brexit
must be seen
through.
My long-held and
passionate
attitude to the
European Union
is summed up in
four words —
three of which
are ‘the
European Union’,
preceded by a
commonly used
four- letter
verb of
exhortation that
the Oxford
English
Dictionary
describes as
‘vulgar’.
I’ve always been
a Eurosceptic,
ever since I
first stumbled
across the
Common Market,
as the EU then
called itself,
in 1962. I was
28, Yorkshire
born and bred,
and, with my
doctorate from
Oxford, was
teaching history
at a university
in New Zealand.
A colleague gave
a lecture on the
Common Market —
and, to my
horror, he
endorsed it as
‘a good thing’.
Incredible.
Almost
blasphemy.
Britain led the
Commonwealth.
New Zealand,
rich in dairy
products, was
its antipodean
farm. Europe was
there for us to
defeat in war.
How could an
Englishman be so
daft?
Austin
Mitchell
campaigning
for
fishermen in
1978. He was
a backbench
Labour MP
for 40 years
before
stepping
down in 2015
Fortunately
General De
Gaulle, the
French
president,
agreed with me
and dismissed
British Prime
Minister Harold
Macmillan’s
efforts to join
a club he should
never have
applied for in
the first place.
I
was further
comforted when a
succession of
British
politicians came
out to New
Zealand to
assure us that
if Britain did
join this alien
institution
then, scout’s
honour, New
Zealand’s access
to the British
market would be
protected. The
old relationship
would carry on.
They lied.
Albion can be
perfidious and
was particularly
so when it
betrayed New
Zealand by
joining in 1973
— egged on by
Tory prime
minister Ted
Heath, who was
so eager to get
us into Europe
that he did so
on less than
favourable
terms. We were
asking to be
clobbered and
duly were.
I
was back in
Britain and had
switched jobs to
become a
journalist and a
presenter on
regional
television when
two years later
Harold Wilson,
the new Labour
PM, called for a
referendum to
endorse or
reject that
decision.
I
voted ‘No’. But
two-thirds of
the country said
‘Yes’. We were
staying in.
I
was far from
convinced this
was the right
decision, and my
hostility
increased when
in 1977 I was
elected Labour
MP for Grimsby.
The town’s
fishing industry
had been ruined
when the
Europeans
cunningly
declared the
seas around
Britain common
waters and gave
other members,
even landlocked
Luxembourg,
equal access.
As a result, we
got only a small
proportion of
our own fish.
I
formed a Save
Britain’s Fish
campaign, which
attracted
support from all
over the
country.
Tory MP Edwina
Currie pointed
out that: ‘You
don’t want to
save Britain’s
fish. You just
want to eat
them.’ Which was
true, but far
better for us to
eat them than
have them
gobbled by
undeserving
Europeans who
took our jobs
and the
processing
industry with
them.
Tory MP
Edwina
Currie
pointed out
that: ‘You
don’t want
to save
Britain’s
fish. You
just want to
eat them’
There was more
to my scepticism
about Europe
than a lingering
desire to catch
our own fish,
however.
I
believed then,
and still do
now, that the
nation state is
not only the
best but the
only way of
advancing the
cause of the
people while
maintaining
their democratic
control of the
process.
There is nothing
the EU can do
for us that we
can’t do better
for ourselves.
Europe is too
big, amorphous,
divided and
powerless.
It’s not a
democracy but a
plutocracy with
a rootless
bureaucracy,
always pursuing
an ever-closer
union the people
don’t want, yet
never able to
reach it.
As a concept it
is a piece of
sublime
mysticism and
nonsense, a
mirage.
The trouble was
that the EU
couldn’t break
away from its
original purpose
of protecting
French
agriculture and
boosting German
industry.
With these two
states
dominating,
Europe embarked
on a journey
where few wanted
to go, to an
ever-closer
union only the
Brussels
bureaucrats
sought, imposing
policies without
democratic
consent and ever
prepared to
overrule the
people for their
own good.
My basic reason
for opposing
membership was
economic. The
European Union
drained Britain
of jobs, money,
demand and
growth.
It became a
brake on our
economy, not an
accelerator.
Being a deal
between the
interests of
Germany, which
needed a bigger
market for its
manufacturing,
and France,
which wanted
agricultural
protection for
its food, the EU
didn’t suit
Britain, a net
agricultural
importer with a
less modern and
less
well-invested
industry.
The basis of
British trade
had been buying
cheap food,
particularly
from
Commonwealth
countries, and
sending them our
manufactured
goods in return.
That stopped
after we joined.
The Common
Agricultural
Policy required
us to buy
France’s more
expensive food.
Costs went up
and every family
of four lost £20
a week.
Meanwhile,
Labour’s policy
to boost jobs in
the regions had
to be scrapped
because it was
against the
rules. What had
been a surplus
in our trade
with Europe
before we went
in became a
steadily growing
deficit.
Our membership
contributions —
in effect, our
payments for
being damaged —
went up year by
year, siphoning
off money to
Europe,
particularly to
the powerful
German economy,
which generated
ever-bigger
surpluses at the
expense of
everyone else
and particularly
us.
To cap all this,
Europe’s fast
growth, which
enthusiasts had
claimed Britain
would hitch up
to, slowed
substantially.
That’s why in my
successful
campaign in the
1979 General
Election, I
stood on a
soapbox outside
the Bird’s Eye
frozen fish
factory in
Grimsby to
denounce
Brussels. And
I’ve been doing
so as vigorously
as I can ever
since.
But I’ve
increasingly
found myself out
on a limb in a
political class
inexorably drawn
to Brussels.
Europe is very
attractive for
those who don’t
like Britain.
For the liberal
intellectuals
and many of our
elite, who saw
themselves as
cosmopolitan
rather than
nationalist,
Europe was nicer
than their
brutal,
xenophobic
compatriots.
Those suffering
in Britain — the
unions, local
government and
the Labour Party
— came to love
the beguiling
hopes Europe
held out for
them.
They didn’t see
that it had no
ability to help
lame dogs over
stiles and that
its handouts
were really the
nation’s own
money coming
back, but with
the EU’s heavy
costs deducted.
My views
remained
unchanged as the
Common Market
marched on,
grandiosing into
the European
Community, then
the European
Union.
Major Labour
figures from Roy
Jenkins to Peter
Mandelson went
off to Brussels
and found a
bigger and
better stage to
strut on.
Brussels
came up with
the Exchange
Rate
Mechanism,
to set in
stone rates
of exchange
between the
various
European
currencies.
Tory Prime
Minister
John Major
took us in
briefly. It
was a
disaster
There, people
actually
listened to them
rather than
dismissing them
out of hand.
They came back
to proclaim
Europe’s
benefits.
Then Brussels
came up with the
Exchange Rate
Mechanism, to
set in stone
rates of
exchange between
the various
European
currencies.
Tory Prime
Minister John
Major took us in
briefly. It was
a disaster. The
whole system
collapsed and
Britain was
humiliatingly
forced out.
We sceptics
heaved a sigh of
relief,
forgetting the
propensity of
dogs to return
to their own
vomit.
Instead of
backing off, the
EU went for an
even stronger
monetary union
by creating the
common currency,
the euro.
Unable to get
electoral
support for
ever-closer
union, the EU
bureaucracy
tried to smuggle
it in through
the back door.
A
common currency,
they hoped,
would lead to
convergence and
develop the
central
institutions
necessary to
manage it.
By now Tony
Blair was in
Downing Street
with his New
Labour re-make.
It wasn’t a
respray job on
the old jalopy
but a total
re-engineering.
Daft as a
Liberal when it
came to anything
that would
demonstrate his
Euro-enthusiasm,
he was
passionately in
favour of a
single European
currency.
Not
understanding
economics, he
didn’t realise
that Britain
would be
shackled by a
fixed, and
inevitably
overvalued,
exchange rate,
with
consequences
ruinous for our
weaker economy.
Fortunately,
Gordon Brown,
his Chancellor,
saw the dangers
and managed to
think up five
tests, failure
in any of which
would deny entry
until the time
was ripe. Which
in my view it
never would be.
Britain stayed
out of the euro,
thank heaven,
leaving us
peripheral to
the Eurozone,
the EU’s great
adventure into
the clouds.
The Eurocrats
persisted with
monetary union,
even though it
forces deflation
on weaker and
less competitive
partners.
Britain would
have been one of
these if we had
been foolish
enough to join
in.
Brussels
showered money
on the weaker
European
economies, then
crippled them
with
unsustainable
and unrepayable
debt, as the
Germans refused
to underwrite
it. Any grudging
help went to
save the banks,
not the
individual
nation.
Increasingly the
EU was losing
its shine.
Unemployment was
high, with a
quarter of its
young people out
of work.
Germany built up
huge economic
surpluses, which
it didn’t spend
or recycle to
the less
successful
economies.
To manage the
euro, the EU
needed the
economic
institutions of
the nation
state, but the
Germans couldn’t
accept that.
The EU could
only move
forward by
greater
federalism to
create
‘ever-closer
union’ but the
members didn’t
want this
straitjacket. It
was hit by the
refugee crisis
and couldn’t
agree on what to
do about it.
By now Tony
Blair was in
Downing
Street with
his New
Labour
re-make. It
wasn’t a
respray job
on the old
jalopy but a
total
re-engineering
It could
possibly have
conciliated
British public
opinion by
delivering
benefits to
Britain, whose
EU membership
costs were
spiralling all
the time.
But it wouldn’t
and didn’t. It
was deadlocked:
rudderless and
dominated by Mrs
Merkel, the most
cautious
politician in
Europe.
Yet still
Britain clung to
the edge of this
rickety raft.
The public were
told to be happy
with this
developing
disaster, and a
Euro-enthusiastic
Tory-led
coalition
government did
nothing about
it.
That is, until
an overconfident
David Cameron
buckled to
pressure in his
own party and
announced that
he would solve
his party
problems by
renegotiating
improved terms
for our
membership, to
be endorsed by a
referendum.