'HOW BANKS CREATE MONEY OUT OF THIN AIR.'

Read the TRUTH from a few sections of Hansard and don't be taken in by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne in 2012.

Bank of England Bill-October-1945-taken from Hansard-House of Commons

 

Lieut.-Colonel Hamilton (Sudbury)

I hope that this House, with the kind indulgence it always shows to a new Member speaking for the first time, will forgive me if I say a few words on first principles. Although for a large number of hon. Members what I say will be elementary and well known, there may also be those in the same situation in which I was in when an inquisitive mind led me to inquire into the processes of banking. I used to regard banks as very useful institutions for safeguarding a man's money and for saving him the trouble of handling large quantities of cash himself. I knew also that they were agencies for large-scale borrowing and lending transactions. I had a subconscious feeling that money was a commodity limited in extent, like potatoes. You either had it or did not have it, and if you did not have it, you certainly could not create it out of thin air. For us private individuals that is only too true, and painfully true sometimes. But I found that in the case of banks the situation was entirely different. Money was a medium of exchange and could easily be created out of nothing. When a bank made a loan, it was not a loan in the ordinary accepted sense of the word, the transferring of purchasing power from one party to another. For the greater part, the money was created in the act of making a loan, and, similarly, when a bank purchased securities, the purchase money was created in the very act of purchase.

I realised also that this process of creating money, and, at other times, the converse process of destroying it, is far and away the most important function of our banking system. It is true that there are people who deny that the banking system creates money, and they point to the fact that, if you look at the balance-sheet of any bank, you find deposits on the one side pretty equal to the advances, securities and other assets on the other side. That is true enough, and they say, further, that that shows that the bank is only using the money deposited with 107 it by its depositors to lend to other people or for other uses. None the less, usually it is the other way round, and the balancing of the balance-sheet is very simply explained, because, when the money is created, obviously, the man into whose hands it comes will deposit it in his banking account. Therefore, a new entry on that side corresponds to the entry on the other side.

If we have any doubt whatever in this matter, we have only to consider the vast volume of money which is represented by the total deposits in our banks—vast in proportion to the actual cash in existence—and ask ourselves, if all that money has not been created by the banks, where in the world has it come from? Once we fully realise that the banking system has this great power of creating money, we surely must be impressed with the position which it gives that system—a position, virtually, of dictatorship in the financial and industrial sphere, because it means, in the first place, that the banking system decides at any given time what the volume of purchasing power in the country shall be, and it decides in accordance, naturally, with its own interests, which may or may not always be the interests of the community.

It has been pointed out that, during that long period of terrible depression which we went through in the 20's, the banks alone were practically the only type of business which prospered, which surely goes to show that their interests are not always the same as the interests of the community. Further, the banks also obviously have power to decide, in large measure, which undertakings and which branches of industry can go ahead and which must contract their operations. I know, of course, that industry gets its funds to a considerable extent from private investors, but, to a greater extent, it gets its financial resources from the banks, and, in that degree, they are the dictators. I do not want it to be thought for an instant that I am casting any aspersions on bankers or financiers. They are honourable citizens, doing their duty according to their lights, neither better nor worse than the rest of us, but I think it would be miraculous if they always put the interests of the community before their own interests. It would indicate a degree of saintliness in their case which I do not think they would actually claim 108 or which any of us would grant them if they did claim it.

It is not their fault if their interests run counter to the interests of the community. It is our fault for letting the system continue which puts them in that position—a system which places millions of ordinary citizens in the hands of a few people responsible, virtually, to no one but themselves, although I know that an hon. Member opposite did claim that it was the shareholders who told them what to do. I doubt myself whether that hon. Member was innocent enough to think that that really represented the position. This is a system which places these citizens at the mercy of these few private men carrying out operations which these citizens hardly understand at all and over which they have no control whatsoever, and, further, operations which, at one time, may plunge numbers of these citizens into the misery of short time and low wages, and, at other times, into the greater misery of rotting in enforced idleness. We have got to change that system. The Chancellor has told us that the method of choosing Governors of the Bank of England needed to be replaced by one that is more intelligent and more dignified. I would go further and say that it needs to be replaced by a system which is democratic and which enables the ordinary man, through his representatives, to control who is going to be Governor, and who are to be part of the management, of the Bank of England.

No industry has suffered more under the vicissitudes which I have been describing than agriculture, the one with which my constituency in West Suffolk is principally concerned, and I may say that people in that industry are beginning to realise it. The farm workers are giving very sensible and practical expression to their realisation, and did so, in the recent General Election, by supporting Labour's policy. The farmers, as a body, have not yet got quite so far, but they did do a rather remarkable thing in my constituency, where a large number of them sponsored for a time an Independent candidate, who was not himself an agriculturist at all. He was a technician and a great student of economics, and his study of economics had led him to believe whole heartedly in this very step we are considering to-day—the nationalisation of the Bank of England and putting finance 109 fully under the control of the nation—although, apart from that, he was still a capitalist. I hope that, in time, the farmers will progress still further and realise that the Labour Party is agriculture's best friend.

Coming back to the Bill, I have spoken of the banking system so far as if it was one unit. So, in a sense, it is, but we know also that it is a two-storeyed edifice. On the upper storey comes the bankers' bank—the Bank of England, which controls, under the limits of the note issue, the total quantity of credit which will be available at any time. In the lower storey come the joint stock banks, with which we ordinary mortals have dealings, and which, subject to the demands imposed by the central bank, can create and destroy money and also decide who is to get the money. I must confess, for my part, that I was disappointed when I saw that pleasant pamphlet which the Chancellor showed us just now, and found that it was only proposed to nationalise the top storey.

I would have preferred to nationalise the whole system straight away, and that for two reasons. First, I think all experience shows that you can control a thing far better if it belongs to you than if it belongs to someone else. Secondly, we know that the banks, by charging interest on all the money that they create, levy a heavy toll on the community, and I cannot really see why that toll should go into private hands. Still, there are those provisions in the Bill which give the central bank the power to request information from the joint stock banks, to make recommendations to them and to give directions to them, and I am very glad that they are there.

The Chancellor has also told us that if they are not sufficient he can take other radical measures later on. I wondered whether the right hon. Gentleman who represents the Scottish Universities (Sir J. Anderson) was, in a way, my ally in wishing to nationalise the joint stock banks, because he spoke of the difficulties the directors of those banks might have in discharging their responsibilities as trustees. Perhaps he feels it would be far better if they were relieved altogether of those responsibilities by having the banks taken over entirely by the nation.

In conclusion, I welcome this Bill. We welcome it on this side. I would not 110 agree with the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) in saying that no question of principle is involved; I think a very important question of principle is involved. I think this is our first step towards the Socialist Commonwealth, the first step towards an ordered economy, organising our resources for the benefit of the community in place of the present chaotic, wasteful and unjust muddle. I think it is the first step towards giving us the same liberty and democracy in the economic sphere which we already enjoy in the political sphere, and it takes place at the strategic key point of the whole economic system because, after all, money is the life-blood of that system. If the supply of the life-blood is not adequate, the system will be anaemic and depressed; if it does not circulate properly to every part, then those parts that are neglected will become gangrenous and diseased. This Bill, when it becomes law, will enable the representatives of the nation to ensure that the supply of money is always adequate to the national needs. I look forward to a series of Measures in the months and years to come which will ensure in every part of our economic system that money will be used in the best and fullest way.

§ Mr. Boothby(Aberdeen and Kincardine, Eastern)

I have listened to many able, and indeed brilliant, maiden speeches in this Parliament, but I can honestly say that I do not think I have listened to any one which has given me greater pleasure than the one which the House has just had the delight of hearing. Not only was it beautifully delivered, but the fact that with quite a large part of the argument I found myself in some measure of agreement, adds warmth to the congratulations which I would now-tender to the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Sudbury (Lieut.-Colonel Hamilton). I think, the House listened to him with the greatest pleasure and with never a moment of boredom, which is perhaps the most important thing of all; and for that reason alone we shall welcome his intervention in our Debates on future occasions.

I do not intend to delay the House unduly this evening. I rise merely to explain the somewhat difficult situation in which I find myself; because for many years past, I have advocated in speech 111 and writing the Measure we are now considering. I hope it is not considered bad form to quote from one's own writings; but in a small but classic work published two years ago—"The New Economy"—I found, on re-reading it the other day, the following sentence: In order to carry out the policy which has been outlined, the Bank of England will have to be converted into a public corporation, owned by the State. There does not seem to me to be any ambiguity about that statement. I feel that, if I did not carry out my conviction in speech and in vote this evening, I might conceivably lay myself open to a charge of lack of conviction or of consistency, or perhaps even of mental stability. On this occasion I have to separate myself reluctantly from my Party; but I must say that if any speech could have induced me to vote against this Measure to-day it was the speech with which the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced it this afternoon. I will not say this is a sacred, but certainly it is a momentous and great occasion in my life. I have really spoken and written and argued a lot about this business for many long years; and I feel it is very important because I have strong convictions in the matter. But when the Chancellor came down with that ridiculous piece of paper with a sort of V-sign in red at the top, and said, "I've got a mandate, "and went on repeating it like a small boy in a nursery saying "I've got an engine, "I felt there was really little reason for debating any further Measures in this House. I beg the Chancellor to remember the high dignity of his office. If what the hon. and. gallant Member for Sudbury said is true—and I am inclined to think it is—that this is a momentous occasion in the history of this House and of the country, then I think the Chancellor's speech should have been more sober and dignified. Not even the soothing re-assurances of my right hon. Friend the Member for the Scottish Universities (Sir J. Anderson) has quite convinced me that the spirit in which the Chancellor has introduced this Measure augurs very well for the future; because of one thing I am absolutely certain, and that is what one hon. Member has pointed out already in this Debate, that in the end, whatever machinery you may set up in this country, nothing works without co-operation on the part of all concerned.

112 Of course this Bill will work, we all know it will work, if the Chancellor gets the genuine co-operation not only of the Bank of England but of the banking system as a whole. I think he will get it if he is careful; but not if he makes many more speeches of the kind he made this afternoon.

On 24th January, 1924, the late Mr. McKenna said, with truth: They who control the credit of the nation direct the policy of Governments, and hold in their hands the destiny of the people. I believe that is true; and for the next seven years "they"—the Governor and Company of the Bank of England—did control the credit of the nation, and few to-day would claim that they made an awfully good job of it. Many people have forgotten those years leading up to the crisis of 1931 but they were really rather melancholy years. We were put back, under strong pressure from the Bank of England and from the City, upon the gold standard at the wrong parity of exchange; and held there, with the full approval of Lord Snowden and of the Labour Government, until we were bankrupt. As the hon. and gallant Member for Sudbury has pointed out, our agriculture was ruined; it was indeed in the doldrums year after year. The real burden of our national debt was doubled, the number of our unemployed was trebled, our output was restricted, our shipyards were closed, our skilled artisans were forced to migrate to the United States. What was perhaps worse, credit was denied to modernise our industrial plant, to build houses for our workers at home, to develop our Colonial Empire. On the other hand, into Central Europe and, above all, into Germany, millions of pounds of good British money were poured, much of which we never saw again.

We do well to remind ourselves at this moment of these things, because I think the situation has greatly changed and I can agree with many hon. Members on both sides of the House who say that they do not want that situation ever to recur. What happened then is exactly what one or two hon. Members, and particularly the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman) in his very able speech, pointed out, that the Government were in a position—and that applies both to the Conservative Government and to the Labour 113 Government of 1929–1931—to fob off the responsibility and put all the blame on to the Bank of England. We had a dual control; and, when things went wrong, the Government could say it was the Bank's fault, and the Bank could say it was the Government's fault; and we in this House had great difficulty in pinning the responsibility on to anyone. I want to pin the responsibility in future for our monetary and financial policy upon the shoulders of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and upon the shoulders of the Government.

Mention has been made of Lord Norman. I think that, in some respects, he is the real architect of this Bill. Nobody denies that he was one of the most selfless public servants who ever worked day and night in the interests of this country—or in what he conceived to be the interests of this country. He had only one fault; he was nearly always wrong. He held the Governorship for so many years that he came to be regarded, not only in the City but far beyond its confines, as the embodiment of power without responsibility. I remember an eminent Governor of the Bank of England telling me many years ago that it was essential, if that institution was to remain out with the control of the Government, that the Governorship should be constantly changed. Prior to Lord Norman's tenure that did happen. You always had a number of ex-Governors, men with great authority and experience, to keep an eye on the Governor; and that system worked rather well, especially during the last century. I remember this Governor telling me that if ever the Governorship came to be held for any great length of time by one man, it would be only a question of time before the Bank was nationalised. He has proved to be right.

Comment on his policy I leave to one of Lord Norman's directors who resigned from the Court—Mr. Vincent Vickers—who said: We have to remember that the value, that is to say, the purchasing power of money, and consequently the price of goods, can be, and has been, varied intentionally and deliberately, not by the will or action of the State, but by those individuals who themselves manage and control the money, though they constantly aver that they act for and on behalf of the community. We returned to the Gold Standard in 1925 for the benefit of the City of London and so ruined our basic industries. It does not follow that what is best for the City of London is best for the country…A monetary system which 114 begets such flagrant injustice cannot be regarded as an equitable system. Yet no one in authority here dares alter the system because the financiers don't want it altered. I would say to my hon. Friends on this side of the House that, although we are entitled to have what views we like upon any subject, it is no use pretending that the Bank of England is an industry. I entirely agree that we on this side should, in principle, oppose—and rightly—thenationalisation of industry unless a very clear case can be made out in favour of it; but it is no use muddling up a central bank with industry and pretending that the two things are the same. They are entirely different. The Bank of England is now almost the only central bank in the world that is not owned and directed by the Government of the country.

It came into existence as a result of the financial difficulties of William III and his consort, Mary. They were in a "jam" because they had a number of wars on their hands, and just could not raise the money to wage them. They then came across a very remarkable man; or, rather, a remarkable man came across them. Needless to say, he came from Scotland and, I need hardly add, from Aberdeenshire. His name was William Paterson. He was very shrewd, and produced a scheme to advance to these hard-pressed monarchs £1,200,000 at a rate of 8 per cent. plus£4,000 expenses. In return, the subscribers were to constitute a corporation, to be known as the Governor and company of the Bank of England, which was to be allowed to deal in bills of exchange or bullion and to have the right to issue notes up to the value of its total capital. There were no flies on Mr. William Paterson. He has an eminent descendant, who is a constituent of mine, and who shares the views I am expressing to the House. Mr. William Paterson said: The Bank hath benefit of interest on all moneys which it creates out of nothing. There is a bit of dynamite in that sentence. The proposal to divest the State of the sovereign right to create and issue money, and to hand it over to a private corporation aroused considerable opposition and alarm. The Bill had no easy passage. In fact, it had a majority of only 12 in another place, where it was vigorously opposed by Lord Halifax, Lord Rochester, Lord Monmouth and Lord Nottingham. Further, the Queen herself had to plead for hours on end with the 115 Privy Council before she could get it through. The Opposition was very largely Tory opposition. When the proposal subsequently came forward for a renewed charter, the right being given to the Bank to double the capital, the fight was a Whig-Tory fight. The Whigs were fighting for the mercantile society; and the Tories were fighting for the landed, agricultural, and newly rising industrial interests of the country. Of course, the situation now is rather complicated in the party to which I have the honour to belong, because the Whigs infiltrated into our party; and a division of opinion arose, as between the mercantile and landed interests. What was the result? Credit, instead of being created under the authority of Parliament, against the productive capacity of the nation as a whole, was created in the form of repayable debt. Effective economic power was transferred from the Government and Parliament to an oligarchy of private bankers of whom the Governor of the Bank of England was the recognised head. That is all I have to say except this—